The Sinification of Western Company Forms in Modern China: A Hybridization of Sinospheres and Anglospheres by CHUNG, Wai Keung
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School of Social Sciences School of Social Sciences
2010
The Sinification of Western Company Forms in
Modern China: A Hybridization of Sinospheres
and Anglospheres
Wai Keung CHUNG
Singapore Management University, wkchung@smu.edu.sg
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research
Part of the Asian Studies Commons, and the Entrepreneurial and Small Business Operations
Commons
This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Social Sciences at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School of Social Sciences by an authorized administrator of Institutional
Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
Chung, Wai Keung. 2010. "Comparing Well-being across Nations: Conceptual and Empirical Issues." In Economic Dynamism in the
Sinospheres and Anglospheres: Identities, Integration and Competition, edited by Ho Tsai-Man C. and Louella CHENG, 273-302. Hong
Kong: University of Hong Kong.
 8 
 
 
THE SINIFICATION OF WESTERN COMPANY FORMS 
IN MODERN CHINA: A HYBRIDISATION OF 
SINOSPHERES AND ANGLOSPHERES 
 
Chung Wai-keung 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 Western company or corporate forms were introduced to China 
for more than a hundred years.  What has been the impact of this 
Western institution on the traditional mode of Chinese family 
business?  At the same time, has the traditional Chinese mode of 
doing business changed any of the fundamental features of this 
Western institution, and in the end created corporate forms with 
“Chinese characteristics”?  This paper uses the historical sociology 
and economic sociology perspectives to analyse the interaction 
between traditional Chinese business and Western corporate forms 
during the late 19th earlier 20th century modern China.  Traditional 
Chinese business convention for sure disappeared significantly 
because of the introduction of the Western corporate forms, but 
notably some of these practices were able to survive because of the 
same reason. There are always similarities and differences in the 
processes of historical development.  The establishment of Western 
corporate forms in China, on the one hand has shared similarities 
with countries with similar experiences, but on the other hand, has 
also provided opportunity for innovation coming out from its 
interaction with the traditional Chinese business.   Because of this 
innovative use of the corporate forms, family business in Chinese 
societies has since then been able to develop further.  In the end, the 
sinification of the Western company forms represents a hybridisation 
of Sinosphere and Anglosphere — both sides were modified and a 
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new model was formed. 
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INTRODUCTION: GLOBALISATION OF 
WESTERN CORPORATE FORMS 
 
 A company, in its historical primitive form, is an economic entity 
that usually involves a larger group of people as shareholders.  This 
organisational form also involves some forms of regulation 
established by the government — either at the early stage the 
company was chartered or later it was regulated under the Company 
Law.  In its mature form, the company represents a legal institution in 
which investment is conducted through an organisation, the company, 
with legal personality independent from the investors.  Investment is 
divided into transferable shares and usually investors’ liabilities are 
limited to the amount they have invested.  It is also a totally new idea 
of property which, on the one hand, the ownership is dispersed and, 
on the other hand, the property could exist indefinitely until it is legally 
dissolved.  When companies become the major actors of the 
economy, this domination represents the idea of turning widespread 
individual economic activities into a national economy, under the 
supervision of a centralised government.  Modern economy is 
therefore a “depersonalised” economic system.  Capitalism, as a way 
of organising this impersonal economy, in a sense, is largely about 
companies, not individuals, making money under the support of the 
legal institution. 
 
 First developed in Europe, this form of business organisation 
eventually diffused to other parts of the world until the mid-19th 
century, when companies of Western countries vigorously looked for 
markets worldwide.  Corporate forms were widely recognised as 
business organisational forms, created through a joint stock 
arrangement, that were used both to consolidate capital and to 
disperse the investment risk.  The idea of organising the economy 
through companies, first spread out among European countries and 
America, was later on also adopted by most societies that had 
developed a modern industrialised economy.  Human societies 
eventually experienced a globalisation of the corporate economy. 
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 Evidently, the diffusion of corporate forms around the world as 
an idea of organisation did not create an isomorphic result.  While the 
organisational form could be the same — with a board of directors, 
shareholders, managers, etc. — apparently, the operational logic of 
the corporations was always socially and culturally defined.  Given 
similar economic motives, the different institutional configurations in 
different societies could have generated different forms of corporate 
governance that are distinguished from each other.1 
 
 Since the mid-19th century, the presence of foreign economic 
powers in China had changed Chinese economic life permanently.  
Competition created by the foreign power pushed both the Chinese 
state and the business community to respond.  Western ideas on how 
the economy should be run, along with many other Western ideas, 
were introduced into China and have been imitated and adopted 
since then.  Pressures for increasing economic competitiveness of 
the Chinese business community in lieu of the economic invasion of 
foreign capital was the “critical juncture” that forced the Chinese 
society to formulate a solution to respond to the “crisis.”2   In 1872, 
the China Merchants’ Stream Navigation Company, the first Chinese 
owned company that was modeled on Western corporate forms, was 
established in China.  New business organisational concepts such as 
board of directors, shareholders, general meetings, limited liability, 
and so forth, were introduced into China and gradually changed the 
contours of commercial life in China. 
 
 
DIFFUSION OF IDEAS: THE HYBRIDISATION 
 
 From an institutionalist perspective, the process by which the 
corporate forms emerged in China was embedded in pre-existing 
institutional configurations.  While the “form” could be copied from the 
West, the actual operation of the corporations would be different if 
economic activities in China were embedded in an institutional history 
different from the West.  David Faure insightfully suggested that what 
we will find out is that tradition-bound attitudes were not replaced by 
the idea of share holding — the most essential feature of a modern 
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company.3  Rather, it was share holding that was being absorbed into 
the Chinese business tradition.  A blending of old and new elements 
did occur during the period of transformation. 
 
 Differences in institutional settings between China and other 
societies are obvious.  Economic transformation in Europe, for 
example, was historically based on a very distinctive institutional 
“path” that China did not pass through.4  Without a similar institutional 
base, companies in China would have been developed from a 
different trajectory.  Many studies on the traditional Chinese business 
world suggest that a very different set of criteria on “ways of doing 
things” had been institutionalised,5 with distinctive conceptions, for 
example, on social relations,6 personal trust,7 profit making,8 use of 
contract,9 and legal system.10  One prominent organisational feature 
of the traditional Chinese business world is its network forms of 
organisation.  While network forms of economic organisation can be 
found in different times and spaces,11 it is evident that networks are 
far more easily developed and more effective in a stable and 
predictable manner in Chinese societies, where personal trust and 
norms of reciprocity are highly institutionalised. 
 
 New institutions did not necessarily replace old ones.  The 
company was established on the pre-existing institutional base of 
China, an institutional base that was used for traditional business 
practices.  Apparently, rather than replacing the old by the new, the 
institutional base of the Western company was now replaced by a 
Chinese one.  Here, the analysis is not to show how “dogmatic and 
stubborn” the Chinese merchants were, but to show how dynamic 
they could be not just in terms of adopting new ideas, but at the same 
time, to incorporate old practices to facilitate the adoption of these 
new ideas. 
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THE PROCESS OF COGNITIVE SHIFT 
 
 The process of introducing the institution of corporate forms 
was basically a process of “diffusion of idea”.  The development and 
operation of an economic institution comes with a system of formal 
and informal rules and regulations.  Even though these rules and 
regulations, especially those formal ones, could be introduced 
through the mechanism of a regular transplant to make the “diffusion” 
successful, there has to be a “cognitive shift” among the wide range 
of actors being involved in that particular institution.  The introduction 
of a new institution is supposed to be more than just the transplant of 
all those external rules and regulations.  The more important part is 
the transformation on the cognitive level, a process through which the 
ideas and rules being introduced would eventually make cognitive 
sense to the actors being involved.  Hence, in order to have a more 
accurate understanding of the process of institutional transformation, 
the focus should be on the level of cognitive shift.  This approach of 
focusing on cognitive shift should be applied to our understanding of 
the introduction of the institution of corporate forms to China. 
 
 Two implications can be derived from this cognitive shift 
perspective.  First, since cognition cannot be totally transformed, the 
original cognitive content will still be more or less around, and will 
therefore influence the subsequence cognitive process.  When 
Western corporate forms were being introduced to China, some of the 
new business concepts were being understood in a way that was 
used by the merchant class to understand traditional practices.  
Besides a small number of merchants (mostly compradors) who had 
experience investing in foreign companies, most people in the society 
had very limited understanding in the institutional features of a 
company, such as the idea of limited liability, shareholders right, etc.  
Thus, when the principles of Western business operation were 
introduced to China, the understanding of this “new thing” (xin shiwu) 
in the business community was largely based on the pre-existing 
cognitive scheme.  The result of this kind of understanding, not to 
mention, would be shaped to a certain extent by the traditional 
Chinese commercial principles.  Furthermore, “imported ideas” are 
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always under a selection process, where ideas that could not be 
easily understood or that could not match well with the reality would 
always be left out intentionally or unintentionally.  We should not, 
however, ignore the possibility that innovative understanding of the 
imported ideas could happen at the same time, where new meanings 
could be created. 
 
 During the process of introducing Western company into China, 
one can recognise the role that the agency of merchants had played 
in the process.  Here agency refers to the fact that the actor, when 
acts, is subjectively able to make a choice on what to do, rather than 
just being constrained externally by structural factors.  By using the 
perspective of agency to understand the introduction of Western 
company to China, what we want to illustrate here is that on the one 
hand institutions can exercise constraints on actors, but on the other 
hand, actors can also have room for agency.  From this perspective, 
the cognitive process that the merchants had gone through in the 
understanding of the institution of Western company is important.    
As a matter of fact, the introduction of company institution should not 
be understood as unidirectional diffusion, rather it is a bidirectional 
interaction.  The transplantation of company institution in China, to a 
certain extent, was shaped by the subjective understanding of this 
Western institution by the Chinese business community and 
subsequently how the community had decided to react.   
 
 What I want to demonstrate here is how Western corporate 
forms could be established in China with a considerable degree of 
development, even though the organisational features of company 
were largely “foreign” to the Chinese.  I argue that Western corporate 
forms in China had experienced an innovative transformation from 
simply as business organisational forms to the “carrier of personal 
resources” of the Chinese entrepreneurs.  Different from a typical 
Western company where shareholders have played a key role in the 
development of corporate forms in the West, Chinese companies 
have on the other hand always been used by the Chinese 
entrepreneurs as a way to consolidate their own personal resources.  
The subscription of shares certainly is an investment behaviour for 
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many, but from the point of view of the entrepreneurs, it represents 
the exercise of their personal social networks to recruit subscribers.  
In the end, this has become a way to bring personal connections and 
social capital together, for the entrepreneurs’ own benefits, through 
an organisational form with a legal definition of a legal personality.   
 
 
THE SINIFICATION OF WESTERN COMPANY INSTITUTION 
 
 From a historical perspective, the transformation of an 
institution is by nature a very difficult thing to happen.  According to 
path dependency theory, it is a very difficult to change from an 
existing path to a new path.12  History matters and historical path 
shapes how things will happen.  The analysis of the “power of inertia,” 
as suggested by sociologist Howard Becker, also indicates that it is 
difficult for the society to accept any new institution because the cost 
of adopting a new institution could be very high, especially when the 
original institution does not have too many shortcomings. 13   It is 
therefore not difficult to imagine unprecedented resistance could have 
been experienced for any kind of institutional change during the late 
Qing period in China, even though there were many reasons why 
reforms of all kinds were needed.  
 
 Accordingly, when the country tried to reform the economy by 
introducing the Western company forms, resistance would obviously 
happen.  As a way to “buffer” the resistance to the institutional 
change, many Chinese traditional commercial customs actually 
survived during the process.  As a consequence, traditional and 
modern elements were co-exist and would certainly make a profound 
effect on this process of institutional diffusion.  The consequence was 
that the forms of company that were developed in China would 
naturally different from their counterparts in the West.  As a matter of 
fact, some of the major institutional features of the Western corporate 
forms seldom play any major role in a typical Chinese firm even up to 
now.  For instance, business transactions are largely based on the 
credit of a person, for example the owner of the company, rather than 
based on the institutional protection that comes with the institution of 
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company forms, such as the use of legal based contract.  With the 
use of pre-existing Chinese business norms and principles to 
subjectively interpret what was meant by a company, the transplant of 
this Western institution to China would inevitably lead to 
organisational forms with “Chinese characteristics”. 
 
 It would be far too difficult to investigate thoroughly how the 
Chinese traditional business practices and commercial ideas actually 
influenced the development of corporate forms in China, since most 
of the influence would be on the day-to-day operational level, and 
written documents on this would unlikely be available.  We can only 
base on particular evidence to make inference on how the process 
was being influenced.    One of the obvious evidence is the practice 
of Guanli or “official interest” that could be found in many Chinese 
enterprises since the establishment of the first Chinese company in 
1872.  Company is to be established for profit, and the subscription of 
company stock is supposed to be an investment.  The value of the 
stock should reflect the performance of the company, and the gain or 
loss of a company should be indirectly distributed to each 
shareholder.  As a fundamental feature of a Western company, this 
feature, however, took a long time before it could take shape in 
China.   
 
 Different from the typical dividend distributed by a company 
when a profit is made, guanli is an agreement made between the 
company and the investors on a fixed annual interest to be paid by 
the company, usually between 6 percent to 8 percent, and is 
independent of whether the company is making a profit or not.  The 
payment has to be made even if the company is in a loss, and in the 
worse case scenario, the capital of the company was used for the 
payment when there was no profit.  Without any practice of entrusted 
investment in the traditional Chinese commerce, and without relevant 
institution such as a legal system that regulated commercial activities, 
to have one’s capital being entrusted to a third party, or an agent, for 
the purpose of profit could never be a popular idea in China.   As a 
response to this situation, the practice of “guanli ” was developed in 
China as a way to provide incentive for people to invest in a 
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company.  We can trace the origin of guanli to the traditional 
partnership in China, where it was not uncommon for the rich to put 
money in a shop with a fixed interest as a return.  There would not be 
any direct involvement in the day to day operation of the business, 
and the purpose of putting money in the shop was purely for the sake 
of the interest.   
 
 Since China did not have a mode of investment close enough to 
that of the Western company, when this “foreign” system entered 
China, pre-existing commercial convention could easily be “re-
installed” into the new system.  Especially when difficulties appeared, 
old conventions very often would be used to solve new problems.14  
The use of the guanli system was to encourage investors to subscribe 
the shares of companies, but this supposedly temporal mode of 
incentive eventually had made fundamental damage on the further 
development of company institution in China.  The use of old 
conventions could have prolonged effect on the development of the 
new institution. 
 
 Because of the fact that guanli had nothing to do with the 
company’s performance, the supposedly investment relationship 
between the company and shareholders in turn became a “debtor-
creditor relationship”.  Shareholders, when in fact became more as 
creditors, would not have much interest in the operation of the 
company.  Shareholders as an important part of the corporate 
governance would then difficult to be developed.  This can largely 
attribute to the very different historical condition that the Chinese 
economy was facing in the late 19th century.  In the 19th century 
England, for example, where there was a continuous increase of 
wealthy people who were looking for investment opportunity, the 
emergence of corporate forms as vehicles of doing business was 
largely the result of this social condition.15  Business enterprises in 
China, on the other hand, had to use all kinds of methods to look for 
investors.  With a much better supply of investors, practice like guanli 
in China will never happen in England. 
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 It is obvious that the rather underdeveloped economic condition 
in China during the second half of the 19th century should be the main 
reason why company as an institution could not develop properly.  
But the influence of traditional Chinese business practices could be of 
equal importance in terms of creating counterforce for the 
development of a business organisation.  Another example of the 
influence of traditional practice in the process of institutionalising a 
company in China is the existence of “savings division” in many 
Chinese companies.   
 
 Until the mid-1930s, when the Chinese government finally 
prohibited the practice, many bigger Chinese firms had set up savings 
divisions, or the chuxubu, that served as a subsidiary division within 
the company structure.16  Since the banking system in China was 
never very well developed in terms of providing financial support to 
enterprises, and the rather “personal” practice of native bank system 
only provided service to those who were somehow personally 
connected to the bank owner; Chinese enterprises had set up their 
own savings division to absorb personal savings from the society as 
an alternative source of capital.  This practice of deposit was again 
not totally new in China.  It was not uncommon for wealthy family in 
the past to leave money in a native bank for an interest.  Enterprises 
were more than willing to accept outsiders’ deposit as a handy way to 
solve the under-capitalisation problem, and they were usually more 
than willing to pay an interest rate higher than the bank rate to attract 
more depositors.17  According to the Company Law, a company must 
conduct the business it was registered for, so a cotton mill was 
supposed to be a cotton mill, and nothing more than that.  An 
enterprise, other than a bank, that established a chuxubu to provide 
savings service actually violated the Company Law.   
 
 There is no way to know how much capital those companies 
actually got from their “savings divisions,” but a study based on a 
hundred case studies shows that the proportion of the savings fund, 
out of the total capital size of the company, was more than 35 percent 
on average.18  While we do not have information about the overall 
practices of this savings service in early 20th century China, the well-
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documented case study on the Wing On Company could probably 
show us the common practice on chuxubu during that time.19 
 
 
Table 1 
Saving Accounts in Shanghai Wing On Company, 
1919-1921(in Yuan) 
 
1918 1919 1920 1921 Saving 
Account No. of 
Account Amount 
No. of 
Account Amount
No. of 
Account Amount
No. of 
Account Amount 
Overseas 
Chinese 
14 16,285 50 146,559 128 280,965 106 211,247 
Shanghai 
Residents 
2 1,327 17 132,254 65 54,264 292 376,048 
Total 16 17,612 67 278,813 193 335,229 398 587,295 
 
Source 20 
 
 In 1918, one year after the business was started, the savings 
accounts in Wing On increased tremendously in the first few years 
(see Table 1).  Guo’s overseas Chinese background had brought to 
the company a good source of capital through savings deposits from 
overseas Chinese, who for some reason preferred to keep their 
money back in their mother country rather than in their country of 
residence.  Local residents, who had generated more confidence with 
the company later on, also contributed a significant amount to these 
savings accounts, in addition to the cash deposited from a good 
portion of Shanghai residents who originally came from Canton, the 
Guo’s homeland. 
 
 The savings division system of Wing On was, in fact, used by 
the company for internal cash flow and to support other companies of 
the Wing On group of companies.  The Guo family also used the 
deposit in the savings division to give out loans to themselves and to 
their relatives and close friends with an interest rate lower than the 
market rate.21  At the same time, the family also “created” further 
profits by putting money in the company’s savings division.  With a 
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different account book that was “internal,” the Guo family (and their 
close friends and relatives) were actually getting higher than the 
standard interest rates by putting money in the company’s savings 
division.  Other companies with similar savings divisions essentially 
ran those divisions the same way as the Wing On’s, with capital 
flowing through the networks of connections.   
 
 The business of savings division indeed provided a way to 
solve the problem of capital shortage, but at the same time it put a 
negative effect on the institutionalisation of company in China.  
Besides the fact that both the savings division and the guanli required 
the company to provide very high interest rates, both of their 
existences were independent of the performance of the enterprise.  
Investors in China during that time, if we could still call them as such, 
were largely people who were looking for guarantee profits, either 
from the guanli or from the savings interest, rather than to take the 
risk of being shareholders.   
 
 The existence of such practices illustrates the fact that 
traditional practices were being used to solve “contemporary” 
problems.  However, both practices contradict to the normal practices 
of a company, and once they had been incorporated into the system 
and had become institutionalised, the influence would be very difficult 
to totally eliminate.  The existence and use of these traditional 
practices had created a distorted image of the company in China as 
an investment tool. 
 
 Another example of how traditional ideas were being 
incorporated during the process of institutionalising corporate forms in 
China is the use of “code name”, or ji in Chinese, instead of real 
name when people subscribed company stocks.  The use of ji in 
traditional Chinese business was very common, especially for shop’s 
name.  It can also be found on partnership contract where code name 
was used to represent certain partners.  This traditional practice could 
commonly be found in the shareholder list of many typical modern 
companies in China before 1949.   
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Figure 1 
The Use of Ji on the Shareholders’ List (1) 
 
 
 
 In Figure 1, we can identify a series of “code names” are being 
used to register as the account names (huming).  There is also a row 
for “name” of the agent who represents the account.  On this sample 
list of shareholders, we have “Lian Ji ”, “Qi Ji ”, “Mei Ji ”, and “Yi Ji ”. 
These four accounts, interestingly, are represented by the same 
person, Li Hui Bo.  If we look at the serial numbers of the stocks 
under each account, they are in a sequence, which means all the 
stocks were bought at the same time.  Based on a random survey on 
more than a hundred copies of shareholder list of Chinese 
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companies, the use of “code name” is a very common practice, and 
most of the time, the name of the “agent” is the name of the real 
owner of the shares.  So in this case, Li Hui Bo bought a total of 100 
shares but then he put them under four different accounts with four 
different code names.  The puzzle here is why Li Hui Bo used four 
different account names when he actually bought the 100 shares in 
one time.   
 
 
Figure 2 
The Use of Ji on the Shareholders’ List (2) 
 
 
 
 In Figure 2, the shareholder list shows that Xuan Ya Yun 
represented “Ren Ji ”, “Yi Ji ”, “Li Ji ”, “Zhi Ji ”, and “Xin Ji ”.  The 
information here indicates that these five accounts each had ten 
shares but then each bought another two shares roughly three 
months later.  We do not have the information to know exactly what 
had happened, but apparently there must be some kind of ownership 
arrangement here, when the five accounts were being treated as 
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separate accounts even though they seemed to belong to the same 
person.  The further proof that the five accounts, while owned by the 
same person, were treated as five different accounts is that the new 
shares that were bought three months later were added equally to 
each account, rather than to set up a sixth account.  Practices like 
this are considered to be “tacit conventions” that no one would 
document it officially.  Many of the actual meanings of these practices 
are not available any more, and only “logical inference” can be made 
from the limited evidence.  
 
 The most obvious reason for doing this of course is that the 
owners did not want to disclose their asset.22  Rather than putting 
their real names as the account names, shareholders disguised their 
ownership by claiming that they were representing someone else.  
Another possible guess on why people did that is that some of them 
might actually use company shareholding as a way of keeping and 
distributing their property.  Based on the way the account names 
were used, it seems reasonable to assume that each account name 
actually represented an independent entity, possibly the owner’s 
wives and children.  Company shares were being used as inheritance 
by dividing equally into a number of pre-assigned accounts for family 
members. 
 
 For Chinese, the subscription of company shares was not 
necessarily being considered as a simple investment behaviour.  
Besides the fact that the subscription of shares that come with fixed 
interest could be seen as a “load”, shareholding could also be used 
as a medium of distributing family asset. All these could be seen as 
innovative use of the Western company forms.  
 
 
FAMILY CAPITALISM WITH A CHINESE CHARACTER 
 
 Before the introduction of Western corporate forms into China, 
traditional Chinese businesses, to a large extent, were being 
regulated by merchant organisations such as hanghui or huiguan 
(guilds or native place associations).  A major characteristic of 
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commerce in Ming and Qing China, these organisations had 
exercised considerable amount of control on both the merchants and 
their businesses.  The restrictive mechanism from these traditional 
organisations on the one hand set limits on the operators of the 
business (e.g. to limit the number of shops one could have), but on 
the other hand, it was also a mechanism that could provide effective 
protection of the business (e.g. to prevent vicious competition).  The 
fundamental characteristic of traditional Chinese business as shown 
was the dependence of individuals on community.  The arrival of the 
institution of Western company in China had had profound effect on 
the basic feature of the Chinese commerce.  The “destructive power” 
that was released by the introduction of Western corporate forms to 
China had unexpectedly directed the Chinese economy into a new 
direction.  In the end, what we are seeing is how the Chinese 
business, through a process of hybridisation with the Western 
corporate forms, has evolved into a family capitalism with the Chinese 
characteristics. 
 
 In the past, business activities, and therefore the merchants, 
were being regulated and supervised by traditional organisations 
such as guilds and native place associations.  The structural features 
of Chinese native banks can be used to illustrate how the merchants 
were traditionally organised.  Native banks (qian zhuang) had been 
an important part of the traditional Chinese financial system up to the 
1930s.  By using the 1927 membership list of the Shanghai native 
bank guild, we can see how the ownership pattern of the native banks 
can provide a vibrant example of how interpersonal networks function 
in a traditional Chinese business setting.23   
 
 From the 1927 membership list, we find out that 50 out of 78 
banks were linked together directly or indirectly through interlocking 
partnership.  Interlocking partnership here means at least one partner 
of bank A is at the same time a partner of at least one other bank.  
Through this interlocking partnership, network of “weak ties” were 
being formed among the native bank partners.24  This network of 
weak ties had connected the majority of native banks in Shanghai 
during that time.   A network of information flow which was used as an 
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informal structure for supervision was created.  When one of the 
banks had problems, the rest of the banks in Shanghai would likely 
receive the information in a relatively short period of time, due to this 
interconnected network of partners.   
 
 The native banking community provided a security net that 
guaranteed and monitored all the individual banks in the locale.  From 
the Chinese banker’s perspective, the system operated in a network 
of personal ties which provided security based on close association 
and trust.  Because of these collective actions, native banks were 
quite efficient in their role as financial institutions and entrepreneurial 
individuals were quite successful in finding new opportunities to invest 
money.  The interconnectedness within the community strengthened 
interpersonal norms and the reliability of personal trust, doing so far 
beyond what was possible within the legal system of the Western 
Europe.  As Janet Tai Landa has pointed out, this combination of trust 
and mutual surveillance lowered transaction costs in the financial 
activities and increased the efficiency in dealing with people with 
good reputations.25 
 
 It is important to point out that, even though what we are seeing 
here is a personal network, it is a network that was operated under an 
overarching structure — the native bank guild.  With the control of the 
guild that discouraged competition, personal networks were used 
here mainly for the sake of cooperation.  While the native banks 
model could be an extreme example, the emphasis on cooperation 
rather than competition was certainly typical in many other 
businesses in late Qing and earlier Republican China. 
 
 This traditional structure of business community in China had 
been debonded since the introduction of Western company forms.  
The roles of the traditional guilds and native place associations in 
China were gradually diminishing.  It was partly due to the 
disappearance of many traditional occupations during the 
modernisation of the economy, but to a certain extent it was also due 
to the institutional changes that were created by the new company 
forms.   
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 Traditionally, the organisational structure of the economy in 
modern China was largely based on the “affinity of place” (diyuan) 
and the “affinity of occupation” (yieyuan).  People either coming from 
the same native place or doing the same business organised 
themselves and created from within a regulative mechanism that 
encouraged cooperation.  The introduction of company, with a totally 
different organisational principles, had certainly created fundamental 
changes in the structure of the Chinese economy.  With shareholders, 
managers, board of directors, and a full range of institutions such as 
tax and legal system, etc. that could be involved, a company is 
organised very different from traditional economic organisation.  A 
company is a legal personality which registers with the government 
according to the Company Law.  It is very different from a shop under 
the control of a traditional guild.  Even though the number of company 
at the turn of the last century was never substantial, businesses 
organised in the company forms were absolutely significant either in 
terms of the economic sectors or the size of capital.  Thus, when 
there were more and more companies being established, a form that 
was independent from traditional guilds and native place 
associations, a structural change of the economy in the society would 
be expected.   
 
 If family business has been the basic structure of the Chinese 
economy, to what extent the introduction of the new Western 
corporate forms has changed it?  The operation of a company 
involves particular features such as a governance structure, some 
division of labour, and the subscription of shares, etc.  A family 
business will be able to use most of these basic features.  What we 
want to argue is that by using the basic features of the Western 
corporate forms, Chinese family business in fact can incorporate all 
the personal connections and social capital together through the use 
of corporate forms as a “carrier”.  The original structure of the 
economy that was under the relations of “same occupation” or “same 
native place” and were controlled by traditional organisations, was 
being debonded into “personalised” social relations, that were not 
under the regulation of traditional guilds and native place associations 
any more.  All the personal relations could now be re-consolidated 
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through the use of the institutional features of a modern Western 
company.   Furthermore, traditional organisational principles of the 
economy began to disappear because new economic organisation, 
the company, was supposed to be an “independent” legal personality 
that was only under the regulation of the government but nothing 
else.   Up to this point, the entrepreneurs, the new kind of merchants, 
could then be free from the constraints from the traditional economic 
structure.  Social relations such as same native place were still in 
use, just that the “carrier” of them was different.  In the past, it was 
the guilds and native place associations, now it became the Western-
origin company. 
 
 Under the new organisational structure of the economy, 
personal connections under the framework of traditional economic 
organisations were now being “liberalised” and reappeared by using 
company as the new medium.  A study on the 1940s Hong Kong 
business community suggests a persuasive example of this 
transitional mode.  Chinese businessmen in Hong Kong were creating 
clusters of companies, where companies that were controlled by 
family members and native fellows were linked up together through 
the interlocking directorates.26  Through interlocking directorates of 
family members and friends, companies were being interconnected, 
and the companies that were connected represent the consolidation 
of social relations among the group of persons who were involved in 
these companies. 
 
 An analysis on the Wing On company group in pre-war China 
and Hong Kong further illustrates how companies of the Wing On 
group were linked up together through interlocking directorates, 
cross-shareholding, and family members occupying management 
positions (See Figure 3).  The more interesting part is how Wing On 
recruited their shareholders.  While major shareholders of the 
companies were family members, relatives or close friends, a 
significant amount of the shareholders, in terms of number, were 
actually native fellows from Zhongshan, the native place of the Guo 
family.  Another significant portion of shareholders was from overseas 
Chinese community, the connections that the Guo family had built 
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when they lived overseas.  These two sources of investment were 
largely based on their personal trust with the Guo family.   
 
 If we look at company as a “carrier of personal resources”, then 
what we are seeing is that the Guo family was pulling together all 
kinds of social relations that they could utilise and consolidated them 
into the company.  Besides the family relations, they were also using 
their native place relations and overseas social ties, and allocated 
these resources to different parts of their company group.   
 
 
Figure 3 
Wing On Company Group (Hong Kong and Shanghai) 
and Its Network Resources 
 
 
Chung Wai-keung 294 
CONCLUSION 
 
 What we try to argue here is that the Chinese merchants did not 
simply adopt the corporate forms and used them to engage in the 
modern economy.  Rather, Chinese merchants, and later Chinese 
entrepreneurs, were using the joint-stock company as a way to 
bundle pre-existing social relations and traditional Chinese business 
practices into a more useful organisational format that allowed for the 
accumulation of capital.  Rather than being developed into a 
capitalism that turns individual economic activities into activities 
conducted by companies — a “depersonalised” economy, the 
capitalism that was developed in pre-war China, and later in many 
overseas Chinese societies, has been an economy that is conducted 
by companies that have largely been “personalised”.   
 
 This process reflects how old ideas could be revealed through 
new medium, but at the same time how old institutional practices 
could create hurdles for the emergence of new institutional practices.  
More importantly, we can see how the participants in the process 
unavoidably used pre-existing “cognitive schema” to make sense of 
new ideas.  And when old and new ideas are interacting with each 
other, there is a chance that innovative use of the new institution 
could have happened.    This study on the sinification of Western 
corporate forms shows how the interaction between ideas and 
practices from Sinosphere and Anglosphere could lead to a hybrid 
mode of organisation.   
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